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STATEMENT BY

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Any person attentive to the wide-ranging and perceptive testimony already given before this distinguished subcommittee must wonder just how to add anything of value on his own. My ideas, far from being original contributions, can only serve to underscore points brought out by preceding witnesses.

The topic is the problem of gearing up the Government for effective foreign policy and defense policy. It is always with us -- a problem never solved with finality.

These realms of policy do not differ from purely domestic policy in respect to purpose and controlling principles. All policies of this Government are supposed to be informed by the great purposes of the state laid down in the preamble of the Constitution. What distinguishes foreign and defense policy, the specific concern to this subcommittee, from the domestic policy is a matter of jurisdiction. Foreign policy and defense policy are directed toward the world environment. They reflect the national will toward matters lying beyond our jurisdiction. In that realm the Government does not exercise ruling authority. It cannot quite lay down the law. It can at best only influence events and circumstances -- not ordain them. Other wills are at work. They stem from premises and focus on purposes often different from our own and quite often not merely different but inimical.

This basic, simple characteristic makes foreign and defense policy more chancy and speculative and sometimes more exasperating than domestic affairs. While the inherent character of these realms of policy sets limits on what can be accomplished by planning, it also makes important and essential that we muster all the foresight, intellectual rigor, and circumspection that we can.

It is for this reason that I, among many, welcome the efforts of this subcommittee in developing a greater consciousness of the nature of policy in these fields and the problem of so organizing as to make possible our best performance.

There are dangers of over-simplification in any discussion of this subject. Analysis inevitably produces some distortion. One makes nice distinctions between policy formulation and operations or between command and staff functions. One draws neat charts dividing responsibilities into geometrically precise compartments. One speaks of levels of authority as if Government could be arranged with the measured symmetry of a staircase. For analysis we divide things up. In practice they are all of a piece together.

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Another set of difficulties arises. The precepts of sound policy and sound policy-making boil down to a set of maxims of copy-book clarity -- concepts indisputable and obvious. One is likely to say of them: that the principles are mere matters of common sense; that everybody knows them. In a way this is true. Yet I think also that something which Clausewitz said of warfare is applicable here. He said that the important things were all simple and that the simple things were most difficult. I am sure that there is nothing recondite about sound policy-making. On the other hand, putting the simple precepts into practice in a government is an enormously exacting task. It requires sustained and rigorous application and unremitting exercise of authority and intellect. Discipline and order within a governing apparatus have to be created anew continuously.

My own way of getting at the problem is to divide the field of policy according to the breadth and the duration of the ideas involved.

I would begin with the enduring end of United States policy toward the world external to our fiat. It is to maintain and to enhance conditions in the world environment favorable to the survival, as political realities within our domain, of the precepts and values chosen and asserted in the foundation of the nation. This is the constant purpose. What it entails varies from one historic phase to another.

What it entails in any one phase might be called our national strategy. This strategy must be recast from epoch to epoch. To do this requires encompassing judgments and broad decisions which set the tone and establish the general premises of our undertakings in world affairs.

You may ask for examples. I suppose the first one in our national history was the decision to venture into independence -- the decision that the Americans would constitute themselves as a nation, work out their own history, and deal with the external world in their own right. A second surely was the early decision to establish a base of continental scope. A third was the great decision asserting the inviolability of the American hemisphere.

More recent decades give us other instances: the decision recognizing the threat to us explicit in the ambitions of the Axis and determining to counter that threat; the decision to bring on and

to relate ourselves to an organized pattern of international responsibility in the sequel to World War II; the decision recognizing the true nature of the threat inherent in the power and thrust of Communism and of the necessity of countervailing action.

How are such decisions arrived at? One may often pinpoint their emergence in some specific pronouncement such as Washington's Farewell Message, President Monroe's Message which marked the origin of what has come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, or, to take a recent instance, the Truman Doctrine. These specific, clear acts are certainly great sources of policy. They are also, however, results of policy-making. They were not struck off as sudden, original acts without antecedents. They emerged from great interplay of forces and ideas and hard consideration within administrations, between administrations and the Congress, and between governing institutions and the public. I know no way of reducing to a graph or to any neat formula the complexities that go to make up the great decisions of policy which in turn serve as the bedrock on which still further structures of policy are erected.

Take one decision which is rarely commented on: the decision which grew out of the experience of the Korean war to involve ourselves specifically and concretely by the continuing commitment of U. S. military forces to positions on other continents.

Parenthetically, it is noteworthy how often this aspect of the Korean struggle is overlooked. The tactical frustrations of the fighting on the Korean peninsula are dwelt upon almost to the exclusion of consideration of the great strategic decisions of global importance accompanying that struggle and essentially related to it.

What I wish to emphasize here is merely the elusiveness and complexity of these great decisions. They were of historic import. Yet, from what I know about the processes producing them, I should find it most difficult to identify the moment when will became resolved, or when multifarious forces converged to produce one clear stream of action, or to say that this or that was the procedure by which it was accomplished.

What I would stress here is the fallacy of the idea -- however much I find it implicit in much that is said and written

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about policy -- that the great decisions are matters requiring only periodic attention.

Decision in this field is not like buying a new car. It is not a case of giving heed to the requirements at stated intervals -- making up one's mind on what model to get and then putting the matter out of mind until the thing becomes worn out or outdated by changes in style. The requirement is for unremitting hard work. The great decisions can be made adequately only in consequence of a great many contributory determinations.

The articulation of our national strategy by no means exhausts the formulation of policy. The attitudes, appreciations, and the will to act reflected in the major strategic determinations must take form in wide arrays of policy undertakings. Auxiliary actions to give effect to our main intentions must be determined upon. Particular situations making demands upon our capabilities arise, and it becomes necessary to decide what to do about them in pursuance of the strategy determined upon. New exigencies arise, and old exigencies decline -- often in consequence of actions we ourselves have taken.

The allocation of resources among our purposes must be continuously reappraised and modified to suit circumstance. Specific policies must be refreshed in response to surges of change in an ever fluctuating environment. Demands arise from political changes within and among other political entities, from shifts in their economies, and from the dynamic of invention. New means have to be devised for emerging situations. Our own schedule of priorities for action must undergo continuous reexamination so as to make the best use we can of what resources we can bring to bear.

So, to recapitulate, our policies have an enduring end. What this enjoins upon us, phase by phase, must be decided on in major strategic determinations. In keeping with these, a host of lesser and more particular decisions have to be made and actions taken -- narrowing down to matters of mere detail and matters of limited and passing significance. Yet I would warn against any attempt to classify decisions according to any fixed scale of importance. There are great fluctuations in importance and difficulty among particular facets of policy from one phase to another. Problems have a way of blowing hot and cold -- rising and falling in their criticalness, passing along on the escalator of

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importance both upward and downward. What are marginal problems in one phase may become central problems in another and vice versa.

Obviously, one characteristic of a properly functioning government is that problems should always get to the proper level of authority for decision -- proper according to a sensible notion of who should be deciding what and of the criteria for decision. This is something so easy to say and so very difficult to ensure. Things go wrong when the level of the deciding authority fails to match the intrinsic importance of the things decided or when the criteria by which decisions are resolved are too narrow.

Obviously a proper economy of authority requires not only that decisions be recognized for their inherent significance, passed to a sufficiently high level of responsibility, and decided according to the fitting criteria, but also that the time of those in the high places of authority should not be squandered on questions of inferior importance. This is elementary.

Now there is no final formula for determining the ratios of importance among problems and assigning them to various levels in the hierarchy of authority -- the question can be worked out only through constant superintendence.

The other main principles of sound policy-making can be reduced to similar simple statements of the obvious. The strategic concepts should be in focus with the actualities of the exterior world and represent an adequate correspondence to the enduring purpose of our policies. Our broad undertakings should be commensurate with the strategic appreciation. The particular actions giving effect to these undertakings should be up to the mark -- that is, adequate with respect to the intentions they are supposed to effectuate. Our means should be allocated among these intentions in accordance with some rational and realistic conception of the hierarchy of our interests and the range of our capabilities. All of it sounds so simple, and all of it is so endlessly exacting in practice.

If our problem were one of mechanics, we could devise our answers on charts, settle our difficulties by procedure, and keep things from getting out of hand by rigging up devices for balance and coordination. The trouble is, however, that our problems are not of this order. They involve another dimension -- the factor of will. Empirical processes can tell us much about the nature of the

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world exterior to our jurisdiction and the forces operating in it, but they never complete for us the image of what these things are or the understanding of what we must do. What we must do flows, in part, from what we are. A study of the environment tells us the problems but never the answer for which we must strive. This must come from some inner dictate -- from values inherent in our nationhood. The whole society is custodian of these values. The defining of what they impose on us in relation to our environment falls, above all and essentially, to the President.

The task of seeing that the major policies are all of a piece and that, taken together, they are congruent with the strategic concept determined upon requires continuous superintendence which only the powers of the Presidential office can supply.

I do not mean just an office. I mean also a man and his full attention. The appreciations necessary to the strategic conception which is the basic element of our policy cannot be achieved by intermittent attention. They cannot emerge from briefings designed to reduce all complexities to a nutshell. They cannot be arrived at through policy papers designed to cover up dilemmas and smooth over the points of crux. The job cannot merely be distributed among subordinates.

If this central requirement of Presidential leadership and executive energy are not fulfilled, it is difficult to the point of impossibility to redress the lack at other points. A thousand committees may deliberate, ten thousand position papers may issue, and the bureaucratic mills may whirl to unprecedented levels of output in memorandums, estimates, and joint reports -- but little will come of it all if the exercise of the central authority vested in the President is faltering, intermittent, or ambiguous.

What I point out here is a consequence of the way our system is geared up. This subcommittee, the Congress as a whole, or any number of people however concerned they may feel, cannot provide substitute answers.

The task of seeing that the major policies form a consistent whole congruent with the strategic concept determined upon requires continuous superintendence that again must fall mainly to the President's responsibility. I would not, however, expect any President to do this alone. He will certainly require

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a vicar, a general manager, a chief of staff, for the foreign policy-defense fields. I believe that vicar should be the Secretary of State. No committee can perform this function for the President. No council can do it. The role must be assigned to an individual -- authorized, deputized and recognized for that purpose. I believe he should have the backing of one of the line departments of the Executive Branch.

I know that it is a common practice to invoke the magic term "coordination." It is assumed that all that is required is to divide up the pie of responsibilities between the departments and agencies of Government and then to direct that lateral coordination between them shall take place. I doubt that the problem is that simple.

The policy framework within which coordination is to take place is all important. Unless that framework is filled in first, coordination in foreign and defense policy becomes meaningless, even mischievous.

In this connection I shall quote from my colleague, Charles Burton Marshall:

My ears pick up on hearing some new plan for coordination among, say, the political, military, and economic aspects of policy. What shall one call the pre-eminent function, the engrossing principle -- as to which the elements of policy are to be coordinated and to which they are to be subordinated -- if not some political function or principle?

States relate to each other in many ways -- the intimidatory or reassuring effect, one to another, of their capabilities for force; the interplay of their capacities to help or hinder or excel each other in production of goods and income; their influence on one another regarding the arts and training; the interchange among them, or the withholding, of organized knowledge about natural phenomena; and direct touch between governments through official channels and through the organizations created to facilitate interchange and collaboration. That list -- military, economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, and organizational -- is representative but not exhaustive. My question is: what is the political function if not that which encompasses,

transcends, and interrelates all the other aspects? The political is the coordinating function, not a function to be coordinated.

A source of feebleness in our making of policy is that we have forgotten the pre-eminently and essentially political character of the state and have vainly expected coordination of policy to materialize without any sufficient political principle around which to coordinate its elements.

I do not mean to rule out committees and councils and the like. They are unequivocally necessary in running a government. Moreover, I am sure that the National Security Council as conceived in the National Defense Act of 1947 is an adjunct of high utility to any President who uses it rightly -- that is, as a forum of decision and not just as a paper mill grinding through the motions of action without really acting or formulating apparent decisions that often do not decide anything.

I do not intend to dismiss the staff function either. Ideas must flow in both directions -- up as well as down -- in the channels of policy. The President, his Secretary of State, and all the chiefs of the organs of policy concerned must always have the candid counsel and steadfast assistance of the best brains they can get.

This brings us to an old point of discussion: whether organizations or individuals count for most in this respect. It is a futile argument. I cannot imagine any organization functioning in the abstract without people to fill the slots. I cannot imagine individuals at work in this field without some understood and rational relationship among them. You must have good organization to get good use out of the right people. You have to have the right people to make even the conceptually best organization work. Good men will demand good organization or else leave. Good organization makes it possible to get and to hold onto the talents of good people.

It is well to remember that we are speaking of functions of government, and that that word comes from a Greek verb for operating a ship. That requires a man at the bridge with a destination in mind and a sense of direction. It requires a first officer who accurately reflects the master's intentions and estimates. Beyond that, the ship must be well organized and well manned. These are not two different things. It is not a question of which at the expense of the other. The two are mutually dependent.

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The continuous reappraisal, the sensing of the exterior situation, the sensing of opportunities for action, the sorting out between the feasible and the infeasible in the realms of action, the anticipating of problems even before they emerge, and the recognition of those which have emerged for what they are -- all these tasks integral to policy-making require mental exercise as exacting as any in human affairs.

It sometimes seems to me that the human attributes for this are the rarest and most highly required of all our needs. Yet in retrospect I often wonder at the richness of the talents available to the Government. Whatever may be wrong with the situation in which we find ourselves, I am sure that the deficiency is not in respect to the spirit and skills of the people available.

Yet we should not take the attributes of the right human resources for granted. The component elements -- here I draw on my own recollections of the public servants of true creative value I have known in the Government -- include, first of all, energy: sheer capacity to get hard work done. Second is acumen: the capacity to engage the mind with reality. Third is intellectual honesty. That is a moral quality involving a sense of devotion to truth, however painful and however at odds with what a superior may wish to hear. I recall a Secretary of State who in a salutatory address to the Department, laid stress on what he called positive loyalty. I think something should be said for the importance of negative loyalty also -- a faculty for shaking the head and saying no when that is what the situation demands.

These are the qualities to be sought, cultivated, and preserved in the channels of policy-making. Good organization is that which attracts individuals with such attributes and makes good use of them by giving them scope and opportunity to be heard. There are no formulas for this in terms of structure and procedure. It is mainly and essentially a question of the spirit which informs policy from the center of authority.

In conclusion I offer a few tentative ideas on organization for policy-making in this complex and difficult field.

a. The organizational arrangements must be responsive to the President's will. He alone can know his own requirements and how they can best be met.

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b. It would seem to me to be normal and sensible if the President were to turn to his Secretary of State to act as his general manager in the foreign field where diplomatic, military, economic and psychological aspects need to be pulled together under a basically political concept. In this general manager capacity the Secretary of State would have the responsibility of seeing to it that the significant questions and data were brought to the President's attention and that he was spared the necessity of squandering his time on the less significant issues.

c. If the Secretary of State has, or is given, this general manager responsibility, he will need a staff recruited, trained and organized to help him in this policy development and coordination function. This function is quite different from that of diplomacy for which most of the Foreign Service is now trained.

d. The National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense's office, perhaps the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Bureau of the Budget, under this organizational concept would require staff people having similar general training and point of view as the Secretary of State's staff for policy development and coordination.